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In this paper, we introduce the Input Rank as a measure to study the organization of global 
supply networks at the firm level. We model the case of a firm that needs assessing the techno-
logical relevance of each direct and indirect supplier on a network-like production function with 
labor and intermediate inputs. In our framework, an input is technologically more relevant if a 
shock on that upstream market can hit harder the marginal costs of a downstream buyer, consid-
ering the topology of the supply structure. A higher labor intensity at each stage buffers the 
transmission of upstream shocks in the network. In addition, we provide for the possibility that 
producers have limited knowledge of inputs in the supply network, hence they can underestimate 
the relevance of more distant inputs. After applications, the Input Rank returns a matrix of tech-
nological centralities that order any direct or indirect input for a representative firm in any output 
industry. We compute the Input Rank on U.S. and world input-output tables. Finally, we test 
how it correlates with choices of vertical integration made by 20,489 U.S. parent companies 
controlling 154,836 affiliates worldwide. We find that a higher Input Rank is positively associ-
ated with higher odds that that input is vertically integrated, relatively more when final demand 
is elastic. A supplier’s Input Rank remains a significant predictor of a firm’s decision to integrate 
even after controlling for the relative positions on upstreamness/downstreamness segments. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Modern economies are organized as webs of specialized producers. Each company can be plunged 
into a production network that starts with the idea of a product by engineering, design or research 
labs, and finally reaches the consumers after a series of technological steps, including the manu-
facturing of parts and components, an assembly line, and the provision of post-production services 
by marketing, advertising and distribution industries. 
 In fact, the technical configuration of production processes can be much complex and re-
cursive in nature when the same intermediate goods and services are repeatedly needed over a 
supply network. A global fragmentation of production processes can originate either spider-like or 
snake-like configurations, depending on technological peculiarities (Baldwin and Venables, 2013). 
Take logistics and distribution services, which are crucial in the delivery of intermediate inputs to 
companies, as well as in the delivery of final goods to consumers. Or else, consider the case of 
most innovative activities, which may require the services of R&D labs at different stages of com-
pletion before final delivery to consumers. 
 Nevertheless, Global Value Chains (GVCs) have been mainly studied assuming a separa-
tion of tasks over linear sequences, i.e. the ‘chains’, oriented on upstream-downstream directions, 
therefore neglecting the recursive nature of modern production  (Costinot, Vogel and Wang, 2013; 
Antràs and Chor, 2013; Fally and Hillberry, 2015; Antràs and de Gortari, 2017; Alfaro et al., 2019; 
de Gortari, 2019). For the sake of simpler assumptions on both theory and empirics, previous 
works propose position metrics, e.g. the upstreamness or downstreamness of a production stage, 
which simulate productive sequences on Input-Output tables (Fally, 2012, Antràs et al., 2012, An-
tràs and Chor, 2013, Alfaro et al., 2017, Miller and Temurshoev, 2017, Wang et al., 2017, Antràs 
and Chor, 2017). It certainly is an advancement for understanding the mutual economic interde-
pendence of firms organized over GVCs. However, linear approximations of complex network 
structures are likely to lead to an underestimation of the importance of some suppliers and an 
overestimation of the importance of others.  
   
 Take the case of the U.S. economy, which we plot as a production network1 in Figure 1. 
According to the U.S. BEA 2002 Input-Output tables, we can represent the U.S. economy as a 
collection of 425 industries (i.e., nodes) linked by 51,768 transactions (i.e., edges). In Figure 1, we 
 
1 A bird’s eye view of the U.S. production network represented in Figure 1 returns an idea of a ‘global’ centrality for 
each industry within a production network whose structure presents a density of 0.286, i.e., the fraction of actual 
linkages out of all potential linkages. The average path length connecting any two industries is just 1.7 links, pointing 
to a small-world nature of the US economy. Briefly, on average, any producer in an output industry sources inputs 
from most of the other industries, either directly or indirectly. Indeed, the network of Figure 1 is not separable: it is 
self-contained in a unique connected component where it is always possible to run seamlessly from one node to another 
just following input linkages. 
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organize U.S. industries on a two-dimension space according to their reciprocal connectivity, fol-
lowing a Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) layout, which in our case posits more requested inputs 
at the center stage. Interestingly, services industries make the core of the U.S production network 
because they are used as direct inputs in many other manufacturing and services industries. On the 
other hand, primary industries like agriculture and forestry are rather peripheral and mostly located 
in the north-west area of the graph. Among services, let us pick the case of R&D (code 541700) 
and Wholesale Trade (code 541800), which seem to be among the most connected industries. In 
fact, wholesalers have a prominent role in professionally distributing many intermediate inputs in 
different moments of the production process, whereas R&D services are pivotal in fostering inno-
vation across most U.S. sectors. Now, let us consider the case of two consumer goods industries: 
Electronic Computer Manufacturing (code 334111) and Automobile Manufacturing (code 
336111). They appear to be at the periphery of the U.S. production network because they mostly 
meet final consumers.  
 
Figure 1: Input-Output Network from U.S. BEA 2002 I-O tables 
 
Note: Nodes represent 425 6-digit NAICS industries from the U.S. BEA 2002 Input-Output tables. Edges represent 
51,768 industry-pair transactions. Network density: 0.286. Average path length: 1.7 links. The graph is visualized 
using a Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) layout with the GEPHI software. More connected industries (weighted out-
degree) at the center stage. Selected industries in evidence.  
 
 However, once we compare the network positions of selected industries in Figure 1 with 
their positions on the downstreamness segment (Antràs and Chor, 2013) in Figure 2, we curiously 
find that both R&D and Wholesale Trade are in the middle of an ideally linear supply chain. This 
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is in contrast with the stylized chain we may have in mind, where a representative business line 
starts with R&D services and ends with distribution services. In fact, when we review computation 
methodologies, we find that downstreamness segments2 are essentially obtained considering the 
weighted relative usage of inputs, intermediate vis à vis final, collapsing an otherwise complex 
production network on a linear sequence. 
 
 
Figure 2: Downstreamness from the U.S. BEA 2002 I-O tables 
 
Note: Downstreamness (DuseTuse) sourced from Antràs and Chor (2013). Frequency indicates how many industries 
out of total 425 from U.S. input-output tables in that position. Selected industries: Scientific Research and Develop-
ment Services (code 541700, value 0.504); Wholesale Trade (code 541800, value 0.666); Electronic Computer Man-
ufacturing (code 334111, value 0.959); Automobile Manufacturing (code 336111, value 0.999). 
 
On the contrary, we argue that the mutually interactive and recursive nature of modern 
production is better understood when we consider the entire technological network, i.e. not only 
how inputs enter in a different order (downstream vs upstream), but also how central they are when 
they are requested as inputs of inputs at different stages of production.  
In this respect, we introduce the Input Rank3 as a bilateral measure of the technological 
relevance of any input-output relationship for the organization of global supply networks. We start 
by modeling the problem of a producer who plans the delivery of her output based on the require-
ments of both direct and indirect inputs. A network production function includes both labor and 
 
2 More recently, Alfaro et al. (2019) compute a Relative Upstreamness to consider the heterogeneity of input positions 
oriented towards different outputs. However, also in this case, the position of R&D services is on average located in 
the middle of the output-specific technological sequences, i.e., the average upstreamness value is 3.044 for an indicator 
that originally ranges approximately from 1 to 8.9. 
3 When we compare the Input Rank with Relative Upstreamness sourced from Alfaro et al. (2019), we find that they 
convey different information. A Spearman rank correlation test shows that they are correlated – 0.31, with a p-value 
< 0.001.  
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intermediate inputs at each production stage. The most important upstream markets for a repre-
sentative producer will be the ones that can have a higher impact on the firm-level marginal costs, 
when a friction transmits downstream, considering the topology of the supply structure. In our 
framework, a higher labor intensity at each stage potentially reduces the transmission of the shock 
from upstream markets. In addition, we model the possibility that a final producer has imperfect 
information on inputs of the supply network. In this case, the ability to outreach indirect suppliers 
is more limited in complex supply structures, and the producer can underestimate the role of trans-
actions far away in the network structure. 
 
  For sake of comparison with previous studies, we compute the Input Rank on U.S. Input-
Output tables, sourced from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US BEA, 2002), and world Input-
Output tables, sourced from both WIOD and EORA. Finally, we test the correlation of the Input 
Rank with choices of vertical integration, in the fashion of Antràs and Chor (2013), Alfaro et al. 
(2017), and Del Prete and Rungi (2017). On a sample of 20,489 U.S. parent companies controlling 
154,836 affiliates worldwide, we find that a higher Input Rank is positively associated to higher 
odds that a (direct or indirect) input is vertically integrated, relatively more when final demand is 
more elastic. We argue that vertical integration allows firms reducing frictions coming from up-
stream markets, and this is an incentive to enlarge the boundary to inputs that are more relevant in 
the supply network. Yet, we also find that parent companies preferably integrate inputs that are 
relatively proximate on the supply network, supporting our theory that limited knowledge of com-
plex upstream markets makes a representative producer underestimate their impact on final pro-
duction. Our findings are robust to different sample compositions, to changing empirical strategies, 
and to the inclusion of downstreamness/upstreamness metrics.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section positions our contribution 
with respect to related literature. Section 3 introduces a compact theory for the Input Rank. In 
Section 4, we compute the Input Rank on both the U.S. and worldwide Input-Output tables to 
describe preliminary evidence. In Section 5, we test the role of the Input Rank in firm-level choices 
of vertical integration. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 6. 
 
 
2  Related literature 
 
A flourishing strand of research studies how the network dimensions in the organization of pro-
duction can contribute to explaining the response of aggregate fluctuations to microeconomic 
shocks (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Carvalho, 2014, Acemoglu et al., 2016). According to Oberfield 
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(2018), buyers and suppliers establish linkages that determine both individual and aggregate 
productivities, as the organization of a network is the result of endogenous collective choices. 
From an international perspective, Chaney (2014) studies the dynamic formation of trade networks 
based on searching processes of partners by exploiting direct and indirect contacts in destination 
markets. More in general, the literature on trade and production networks is still in its infancy, and 
many questions remain unanswered (Bernard and Moxnes, 2018).  
 This is the case of the emergence of GVCs, which are mainly modelled and tested as sup-
posedly linear technological sequence (Fally, 2012; Antràs et al., 2012; Antràs and Chor, 2013; 
Miller and Temurshoev, 2017; Wang et al., 2017; Antràs and Chor, 2018; Alfaro et al., 2019),  
even if the existence of spider-like vs snake-like configurations has been acknowledged as depend-
ing on engineering details (Baldwin and Venables, 2013). A first step in modeling a production 
network has been made by Antràs and de Gortari (2017), who assume that a linear technology 
interacts with central geographic locations. Richer information on the configuration of GVCs is 
also exploited by de Gortari (2019) to build numerical counterfactuals on the transmission of value 
from inputs to outputs. 
 In our contribution, we introduce the Input Rank as a network position measure of the 
technological relevance of any direct or indirect input for a representative producer in an output 
industry. The Input Rank considers the recursive nature of real-world webs of suppliers and buyers 
when trade or contractual frictions can be encountered at any production step. We model the prob-
lem of input ranking on a nested production function that encompasses upstream markets because 
what happens in any upstream market has consequences on the ability to delivering a final output. 
A producer will rank any direct or indirect input relatively higher when a sourcing friction on that 
input market transmits downstream with a higher impact on marginal costs. Realistically, we pro-
vide for the possibility that a producer may have only a limited knowledge of the entire supply 
network, discounting relatively more the risk of frictions coming from faraway upstream indus-
tries. 
  Our measure is to some extent inspired by the PageRank centrality first applied in social 
networks and search engines (Brin and Page, 1998), to assess the relevant information consumed 
by internet users. The PageRank tool has by now spread to many different domains4, from biology 
and genetics to financial debts, bibliometrics, and engineering of road networks Gleich (2015). 
The main idea of the PageRank is that a web page is more important if other important web pages 
have hyperlinks pointing to it. In our framework, the Input Rank assumes that:  
   
 
4 For a previous adaptation of a Page Rank centrality in the economics domain, see the DebtRank by Battiston et al. 
(2012), where connectivity among financial institutions and debt exposures are considered to determine the systemic 
importance of a node in a financial network. For a basic introduction to network position metrics, see Early and 
Kleinberg (2010). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3488349 
7 
 
 i) a (direct or indirect) input that is relatively more requested to produce other (direct or 
indirect) inputs must rank relatively higher;  
 
 ii) a (direct or indirect) input that is relatively more requested to produce other highly re-
quested inputs is relatively more relevant than a (direct or indirect) input that delivers to less-
requested inputs. 
 
 Eventually, we test the association of the Input Rank against vertical integration choices by 
U.S. multinational enterprises. In this, we relate to the recent strand of research that studies the 
firm-level organization of GVCs5. Acemoglu et al. (2007) are the first to study a theoretical frame-
work where unique headquarters commit to contracts with multiple suppliers. More recently, 
Harms et al. (2012) analyze the offshoring decision of firms whose production process is charac-
terized by a sequence of steps and a non-monotonic variation of transportation costs. Costinot et 
al. (2013) derive a sequential multi-country model in which mistakes can occur with a given prob-
ability along a sequence, hence countries performing more knowledge-intensive tasks are better 
situated relatively more upstream and participate to a larger share in world income distribution. 
Interestingly, Fally and Hillberry (2015) include Coasian transaction costs to explain the length of 
a supply chain and the cross-country variation in gross output-to-value added ratios. In each of the 
previous works, the notion of a GVC assumes different shades of meaning.  
 We stream our work following the intuition by Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. 
(2019), who model a supply chain as a technology made of production stages where each down-
stream output depends on a set of upstream (direct or indirect) inputs. In that framework, all pro-
ducers shall rely on a surplus from the sale of the final output, and economic dependence is estab-
lished along the supply chain, for how that surplus is optimally generated by and allocated among 
producers. In this case, the main prediction is that final-good producers integrate stages that are 
relatively more downstream (upstream) when final demand is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). How-
ever, when it comes to firm-level empirics, Del Prete and Rungi (2017) find that vertical integra-
tion choices are not always in line with theoretical predictions, as parent companies and affiliates 
locate not so far from each other along upstreamness/downstreamness segments.  
 In this contribution, we build on a similar framework and find that a higher Input Rank is 
always associated with higher odds that that input is vertically integrated, even after controlling 
for the position on the downstreamness/upstreamness segments, and that proximate inputs on the 
network are more likely integrated than distant ones. 
 
 
5 For a detailed review since the seminal work by Grossman and Hart (1986), see Aghion and Holden (2011). See also 
Antràs and Yeaple (2014) for a review on trade and firm-level organization of multinational enterprises. 
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3   A model for the Input Rank 
 
In this section, we lay out the theoretical foundations for input ranking over supply net-
works. Assessing the importance of a supplier of a given firm is not a straightforward task when 
production processes are fragmented. To illustrate this point, we start with a stylized example de-
picted in Figure 3, where nodes indicate sectors or, alternatively, representative firms from those 
sectors, while directed links indicate the flows of goods or services. The output of each firm can 
be used as an intermediate input, as well as a consumption good.  
 




Let us focus on the supply chain of firm 1. Failure of firm 4 to provide an appropriate input 
to firm 3 creates a friction that affects firm 3's production process. The friction is (partially) passed 
down to firm 1 and firm 2 because both use input 3 in their production. For instance, the afore-
mentioned friction can imply an increase in the price of the intermediate input provided by firm 4, 
which will increase the production cost of firm 3. This will, in turn, affect both firm 1 and firm 2 
that use good 3 in the production. Eventually, the production process of firm 1 is affected by both 
firm 2 and firm 3. More in general, we expect that a firm will be more affected by a distortion 
hitting an upstream supplier if: i) firms in the economy rely more on the deliveries of intermediate 
inputs; ii) the network is more connected, in the sense that there are more paths starting from the 
affected supplier and leading to that firm. 
 
When supply networks become more complex, it is also conceivable that the manager of 
firm 1 does not fully observe what is happening on upstream markets, and therefore she cannot 
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establish the relevance and the magnitude of a shock coming from those markets. This is especially 
true for suppliers that are relatively more distant in the supply network. For instance, the manager 
of firm 1 may not be able to observe the quality and the quantity of intermediate inputs that firm 6 
and 7 reciprocally exchange.  
 
In line with the above intuition, we present below a theory for the Input Rank that accounts 
for the topology of a supply network where frictions (e.g. trade barriers or contractual institutions) 
potentially transmit downstream, including the case that knowledge of indirect suppliers is more 
limited. Our theoretical framework is in many respects a standard for production networks6, and 
thus we present it in a quite compact manner. Formal proofs of the claims are in Appendix A.  
 
There are two types of agents in the economy: firms and the representative consumer. We 
denote the full set of firms in the economy with N. Firms group in M sectors. Each firm belongs to 
exactly one sector, and it produces a single differentiated variety of a sector-specific good. 
 
3.1  Consumers 
 
The representative consumer owns all firms in the economy and supplies one unit of labor inelas-
tically. The preferences of the consumer over M goods are defined with the following Cobb-Doug-
las utility function: 
 
 








where 𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 is the consumption of good k and ∑𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘 = 1, while the parameter 𝜃𝜃 = ∏ 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘
−𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀
𝑘𝑘=1  is a nor-
















where 𝑐𝑐(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) is the consumption of variety i of a good k,  𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution 
across varieties of good k, and 𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘 denotes the number of firms, each producing a different variety 
i in the kth sector. 
 
6 See also Baqee (2018) and Grassi (2017).  
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where 𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) is the price of variety i in sector k, 𝜋𝜋(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) is the profit of firm i in sector k, and w is a 
worker’s wage bill. 
 
3.2  Firms 
 
Firms in the k-th sector are symmetric and benefit from the same technology with constant returns 
to scale that combines labor and intermediate inputs. Each firm in a sector produces an imperfectly 
substitutable variety i of good k. Let us denote with 𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) the output of firm i from sector k, with 
𝑙𝑙(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖)its labor input, and with 𝑥𝑥(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖,ℎ, 𝑗𝑗) the amount of variety j of good h used in the production 
of variety i of good k. The profits of any firm i in sector k are simply defined with: 
 
 









The production function of firm i in sector k is defined by 
 
 













where 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘  and 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  are standard Cobb-Douglas elasticity parameters such that 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 = 1, while 
𝜁𝜁𝑘𝑘 = �𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘
−𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 ∏ 𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑘𝑘−𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁ℎ=1 � is a normalizing constant that simplifies computations. Due to the 
Cobb-Douglas nature of the production function, the non-negative vector (𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑘𝑘)ℎ=1𝑀𝑀  reflects the rel-
ative intensity with which firms in sector k use intermediate inputs ℎ ∈ {1,2, . . . ,𝑀𝑀}. Hence, the 
sector level production structure of the economy is characterized by the (column-stochastic) adja-
cency matrix 𝐆𝐆 = (𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑘𝑘)ℎ,𝑘𝑘=1𝑀𝑀 .  
 
Crucially, we include in (5) an input-specific productivity parameter, 𝜏𝜏ℎ, which catches any 
general distortion/friction encountered on an upstream market h. In this basic framework, market 
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frictions are assumed exogenous and valid for all buyers of the same input7. The higher the friction 
for an input market the lower the parameter, 𝜏𝜏ℎ. Distortion 𝜏𝜏ℎ, in a reduced form, captures any type 
of distortion that results in a decrease in the productivity of intermediate inputs produced in sector 
h. For instance, when it is difficult to write a contract for sourcing goods produced in a sector h, it 
is more likely that firms will find those inputs from sector h less compatible with the production 
process, hence less productive. Alternatively, in our model, the friction 𝜏𝜏ℎ  will have the same effect 
as a price wedge. Indeed, when there is a friction 𝜏𝜏ℎ, the price of 1 unit of good h (with productivity 
1) will effectively be scaled up by factor 1 𝜏𝜏ℎ⁄ . One obvious case of such market frictions is tariff 
or non-tariff barriers, which increase the per-unit input price. 
 At this point, we define the composite intermediate input as an aggregate of varieties pro-
duced in a sector h, in the form: 
 
 












Therefore, we can rewrite (5) as 
 
 









3.3  Market equilibrium 
 
We assume that firms in a sector compete in a monopolistic competition environment, and thus set 
their price to a constant markup over marginal costs. Following Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and 
Grassi (2017), we assume that firms set their prices taking as given the other sectors’ prices and 
quantities, the wage bill, and the aggregate prices and quantities. We are now ready to introduce a 
notion of market equilibrium we envisage, whose existence and uniqueness follow from standard 
arguments. For details, see for instance Baqaee (2018). 
 
Definition 1. [Market Equilibrium] A market equilibrium is a collection of prices  𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖), wage 
w, input demands 𝑥𝑥(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖,ℎ, 𝑗𝑗), outputs 𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖), consumption 𝑐𝑐(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖), and labor demands 𝑙𝑙(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) such 
that: 
 
7 One could further model this parameter as firm-specific, 𝜏𝜏(ℎ, 𝑗𝑗) or even buyer-supplier specific,𝜏𝜏(ℎ, 𝑗𝑗, 𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) , assum-
ing that responses to frictions are heterogeneous. For the purpose of our analysis, we rule out heterogeneity within an 
industry and impose that any friction hits all varieties in an industry in the same way.  
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 (i) Each firm maximizes its profits taking as given the sector price level and demand, 
 (ii) The representative consumer chooses consumption to maximize utility, 
 (iii) Markets for each good and labor clear. 
 
3.4  The Input Rank 
 
For our purpose, we consider two scenarios. First, we discuss a case when firms perfectly observe 
the structure of their supply network, i.e. they know the full technology made of direct and indirect 
inputs needed to deliver their output. More realistically, in a second scenario, we assume that firms 
have imperfect information on their supply networks, which may include a relatively high number 
of input-output relationships. 
 
 Before presenting our results, let us introduce further notation. We call a diagonal matrix 
D that matrix that contains information about sector-specific intermediate input elasticities, 
{𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟}𝑟𝑟=1𝑀𝑀 . That is, each element of the matrix D tells us how much intermediate inputs a representa-
tive firm in a sector uses over total inputs in the equilibrium. Further, we introduce parameter 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘 ∈
(0, 1] that captures the probability (share of) suppliers of each firm that a manager of firm 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑘𝑘 
observes. The following definition formally introduces the concept of the Input Rank in production 
networks.  
 
Definition 2. [Input Rank] Denote with 𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘 the k-th unit vector. We define the Input Rank of a sup-
plier of an input h relative to the producer of an output k as: 
 
 𝜐𝜐ℎ𝑘𝑘(𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆,𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘) = 𝐞𝐞𝑘𝑘′ [𝐈𝐈 − 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆′]−1𝐞𝐞ℎ = 𝐞𝐞ℎ′ [𝐈𝐈 − 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆]−1𝐞𝐞𝑘𝑘 (8) 
 
In other words, the bilateral Input Rank 𝜐𝜐ℎ𝑘𝑘(𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆,𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘)  is (h,k)-th element of the matrix 
[𝐈𝐈 − 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆]−1. In a special case, when all sectors have the same elasticity of the output with respect 
to intermediate inputs, 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟 = 𝛿𝛿,∀𝑟𝑟 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀, the Input Rank essentially captures the sum of all 
weighted paths from k to h in the production network, moving upstream through the network, 
where paths of length d are discounted by a factor (𝜒𝜒𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑. Finally, we note that the inverse in (8) 
exists since 𝐆𝐆 is a column stochastic matrix, hence the spectral radius of 𝐆𝐆 is 1. Since 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘 ≤ 1 and 
𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 ≤ 1,  ∀𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑀𝑀, the inverse in equation (8) will also exist. 
From the perspective of a producer, the Input Rank vector, 𝝊𝝊𝑘𝑘 = (𝜈𝜈ℎ𝑘𝑘)ℎ=1𝑀𝑀 , encodes the in-
formation on the structure of the production technology on her supply network, and a possibly 
limited ability to outreach all suppliers.  




Perfect information on the supply network 
 
Let us start considering the case when a producer perfectly observes her supply network, i.e. when 
𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘 = 1. The following proposition relates the Input Rank, 𝜐𝜐ℎ𝑘𝑘(𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆, 1), and the marginal costs of a 
producer, 𝜆𝜆(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖), after considering her entire supply network.  
 
Proposition 1. Let ?̆?𝜆(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) denote the logarithm of the marginal cost of production of firm i in sector 
k. Let ?̆?𝜏ℎ denote the logarithm of the friction on the upstream market h. Suppose that firms perfectly 








when 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟 = 𝛿𝛿,∀𝑟𝑟, then 𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆 = 𝛿𝛿𝐆𝐆. 
 
We report proof of Proposition 1 in the Proof Appendix. In a nutshell, the higher the po-
tential impact of frictions from an upstream market on marginal costs, the higher the ranking of 
that input from the perspective of a downstream buyer. In our framework, a lower distortion im-
plies a higher productivity parameter, 𝜏𝜏ℎ, hence a decrease in the marginal costs of production. 
Eventually, the impact of any upstream friction on the marginal costs of a final producer is a func-
tion of both the structure of the supply network, 𝐆𝐆, and of the relative input intensities, (𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟)𝑟𝑟=1𝑀𝑀 , of 
each industry.  
 
Imperfect information on the supply network 
 
Suppose now that a producer i observes her supply network with some imperfections. That is, a 
firm i in a sector k has a probability 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘 of observing suppliers of firms of any given sector in the 
network.8 We assume that this probability is output-specific, i.e., it varies across end-use sectors. 
In this way, we explicitly contemplate the possibility that some supply networks are too complex 
to explore, and a producer is able to assess the contribution of any indirect input based solely on 
the portion of technology she is able to observe. The following corollary directly follows from 
Proposition 1: 
 
8 More realistically we may consider the case when firms in sector k observe suppliers of firms in r with independent 
probability 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟 , 𝑟𝑟 ∈ 𝑀𝑀. Then we would replace scalar 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘 with diagonal matrix 𝐇𝐇𝑘𝑘 that has diagonal elements equal to 
𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟 . One possible interesting interpretation of 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟  in that case is that it would also capture the contractibility of a 
sector, in the sense of Rauch (1999). 












when 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟 = 𝛿𝛿,∀𝑟𝑟, and 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘 = 𝜒𝜒 ∀𝑘𝑘, then  𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆 = 𝜒𝜒𝛿𝛿𝐆𝐆. 
 
 Briefly, from the perspective of final producer i, any friction on an upstream market can be 
perceived as less important the more difficult its exploration because it is more distant in the supply 
network, given the damping factor, 𝜒𝜒, and considering the relative usage of intermediate inputs, 𝛿𝛿.  
 To understand better the intuition introduced above, it is worth looking back once again at 
the fictional supply network reported in Figure 3. When exploring her supply network, any time 
the manager of a firm 1 tries to collect information about upstream transactions, say about trans-
actions between firm 3 and its suppliers, she has a limited ability to know the quality and quantity 
of deliveries. She can call the direct supplier and ask or, alternatively, she can gather information 
on the market when, for example, prices and quality of upstream inputs are relatively standard. 
However, at any further passage upstream, e.g. from firm 4 up to firm 6, the same problem starts 
all over again. Eventually, the dumping rate 𝜒𝜒 discounts distant nodes relatively more than proxi-
mate nodes, hence assuming that the ability to outreach on indirect suppliers is decreasing with the 
distance on the supply network9.  
 On the other hand, some industries are relatively less input-intensive than others, hence 
when 𝛿𝛿 is low, the impact of a missed delivery by a direct or indirect supplier has a smaller impact 
on the final producer.  
 
3.5  Observations 
 
On the role of centrality 
 
Both in the case of perfect or imperfect information, the structure of the supply network, 𝐆𝐆, is 
crucial to understand the impact of any frictions or shocks coming from upstream markets. From 
this point of view, the Input Rank catches the features of sophisticated technological processes, 
when some inputs are used more than once and with a different intensity on a firm’s supply net-
work. We insist here on the characteristics of the Input Rank as an eigenvector centrality, which 
 
9 This is easy to see once we look at the recursive computation: [𝐈𝐈 − 𝜒𝜒𝛿𝛿𝐆𝐆]−1 = 𝐈𝐈 + 𝜒𝜒𝛿𝛿𝐆𝐆 + (𝜒𝜒𝛿𝛿)2𝐆𝐆2 + (𝜒𝜒𝛿𝛿)3𝐆𝐆3+. .. 
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measures the technological relevance of each input from the perspective of a downstream pro-
ducer, such that: 
 
i. an input is more technologically relevant if it is requested to produce other (direct or indi-
rect) inputs; 
ii. an input is more technologically relevant in downstream industries if it is requested to pro-
duce other highly requested (direct or indirect) inputs. 
 
 For a visual intuition of the previous characteristics, let us look back at the fictional supply 
network of Figure 3. The first property is evident if we compare the roles of firms 2 and 3. They 
are both direct suppliers of firm 1, but firm 3 is relatively more central in the supply network of 
firm 1 because it also delivers to firm 2. If firm 3 fails to deliver, firm 2 can also have problems 
and the impact on firm 1 is magnified. 
The second property is evident if we compare the roles of firms 4 and 5. They are both indirect 
suppliers of firm 1 located at the same distance on the supply network. Yet, firm 4 is relatively 
more important in the supply network of firm 1 because it delivers to firm 3 that is, in turn, more 
relevant because more ‘central’ among direct suppliers. In other words, firm 4 borrows some ‘cen-
trality’ from firm 3. In fact, if firm 4 does not deliver, firm 3 will receive the distortion and will 
pass it to firm 1 through two different production paths.  
  
On the role of frictions on input markets 
 
There are plentiful reasons to consider frictions over supply networks. For example, when an input 
is sourced from abroad, tariff or non-tariff barriers can reverberate to downstream buyers and have 
an indirect impact on marginal costs. Among others, a change in contracting frictions on upstream 
markets can have a similar impact on a downstream producer. Whether the input is delivered from 
abroad or not, a buyer and a supplier will never be able to sign the perfect contract that provides a 
detailed understanding of all the responsibilities and requirements, eliminating forever the risk of 
later disputes. Hence, an input delivery may not be entirely contractible, and we can assume that 
the degree of contractibility is specific to an input market, i.e. encompassing all the varieties of-
fered on that market. Accordingly, our productivity parameter, 0 < 𝜏𝜏ℎ ≤ 1, catches the compati-
bility of that input in the production process. In our case, a higher contractibility on an input market 
implies a higher productivity parameter for that input, and a lower impact on marginal costs, as 
(9). Alternatively, one can think of the productivity parameter, 𝜏𝜏ℎ, as a searching cost on an input 
market. In this case, a lower searching cost for any single input will reduce firm-level marginal 
costs. This approach is in line with the original intuition by Rauch (1999), who considered an input 
relatively more contractible when it is sold on organized exchanges or when its price is referenced.  
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 However, please note how the source of any friction is considered always exogenous in 
our simple framework, as is the organization choice of the firm. Our basic model does not explic-
itly entail a case of intra-firm vis à vis arm’s length exchange of inputs. Nonetheless, we can argue 
that, in an environment like the one captured by our model, it could be more beneficial for any 
firm, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑘𝑘, to integrate a supplier of an input, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ ℎ, if the expected decrease in the per-unit cost of 
production, 𝜕𝜕?̆?𝜆(𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖)
𝜕𝜕?̆?𝜏ℎ
, is larger after vertical integration. That is, if we expect that any friction becomes 
lower or any shock can be controlled after vertical integration, making an input more productive.  
Then, in our framework the productivity parameter 𝜏𝜏ℎ becomes bigger and the impact on a firm’s 
marginal costs is positive. This may be accomplished, for instance, through a better coordination 
of the production process or after a more efficient contract enforcement. We test this correlation 
in Section 5, although we can say nothing more on the optimal organization of the firm boundary, 
e.g. how many inputs are made in-house and how many are bought on the market. 
 
On the role of the damping rate 
 
We model imperfect information about a supply network as an output-specific dumping rate 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘 ∈
(0,1], which encodes the ability of a representative producer in an industry to search information 
on upstream markets. From a practical point of view, when 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘 is smaller, direct and indirect sup-
pliers that are relatively closer to the final producer will have a relatively higher Input Rank than 
more distant suppliers.  
  
 
Figure 4: The damping rate in a stylized supply network 
 
Note: On the y-axis, a simulation of the Input Rank estimated on the fictional supply network in Figure 3. To make 
our point as clear as possible, we assume the economy does not include the labor input, thus 𝛿𝛿 = 1. 
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To illustrate this property, we plot comparative statics of the Input Rank of main nodes 
detected in Figure 3 as a function of the damping rate. For simplicity, we assume that all inputs of 
a given firm are symmetric, meaning that for a fixed node j and any two of its suppliers r and s, 
we have 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 = 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗. Interestingly, although there are more paths connecting firm 1 to firm 6 than 
firm 1 to firm 2, firm 2 will eventually have a disproportionately higher Input Rank when the 
damping rate is smaller and smaller. Please note how, empirically, the average value of 𝛿𝛿 across 
sectors in the US economy is estimated 0.5 by Acemoglu et al. (2012), hence we can expect the 
damping factor 𝜒𝜒𝛿𝛿 to be relatively small on average. In the following analyses, we first test a 
damping factor calibrated exclusively on 0.5, and then we discount it using input average contract-
ibility à la Rauch (1999). 
 
On the role of the elasticity of substitution 
 
In the Proof Appendix, we include a demonstration that the more elastic is the demand of the final 
producer the higher the proportional impact of frictions on firm-level profits,  𝜕𝜕?̆?𝜋(𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖)
𝜕𝜕?̆?𝜏ℎ𝜕𝜕𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘
> 0, whenever 
𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘 > 1. We already gather from Proposition 1 that any downstream producer has an incentive to 
reduce frictions over her supply network to avoid lesser marginal costs. Here we add that such an 
incentive is higher when the demand faced by the final producer is relatively more elastic. See also 
the role of elasticity of substitution tested on vertical integration choices in Section 5.  
 
 
4   Applications of the Input Rank 
 
We compute the Input Rank on the U.S. and world Input-Output tables.  U.S. I-O 2002 tables, 
compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), sketch a reasonably fine-grained supply 
network established among 6-digit industries. The same tables have been extensively used to study 
production networks (Carvalho, 2014), vertical integration choices (Acemoglu et al., 2009; Alfaro 
et al., 2016), and to compute Upstreamness/Downstreamness metrics (Antràs and Chor, 2013: Al-
faro et al., 2019). In Figure 1, we already showed how a solid and complex production network 
emerges from these tables, made of 51,768 linkages established among 425 industries. After a 
closer look, we register a strong heterogeneity in the sourcing strategies at the industry level. For 
example, in Appendix Figures C1 and C2, we report both the in-degree and out-degree distribu-
tions by industry, i.e., the number of inputs received and the deliveries made by each node of the 
U.S. production network. On average, the in-degree of an industry is higher than its out-degree.  
As expected, the industry with the highest number of input industries (296) is the Retail Trade 
(code 4A0000), because retailers professionally sell physical goods to consumers. On the other 
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hand, the industry with the highest number of purchasing industries (425) is the Wholesale Trade 
(code 420000), because wholesalers professionally distribute intermediate physical inputs to all 
industries. Yet, ‘global’ centralities measured by in- or out-degrees are of scarce interest to under-
stand the ‘local’ role of an upstream industry with respect to each specific downstream output. 
More properly, the Input Rank shall return the technological relevance10 of that input market con-
sidering the peculiar topology of a supply network for any representative producer in an output 
industry.  
 
Figure 5: Input Rank computed on U.S. 2002 Input-Output tables (damping factor = 0.5) 
 
Note: Input Rank vectors are computed for each root output among 425 industries classified at the 6-digit in the U.S. 
BEA 2002 tables. We assume 𝜒𝜒 = 1 and 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 = 𝛿𝛿 = 0.5. Inputs on the y-axes and outputs on the x-axes by alpha-
numeric order. A darker cell implies that an input is more technologically relevant for an output. 
 
In Figure 5, we visualize the results from the computation of the Input Rank as a matrix of 
industry-pair values. For the moment, we assume that producers do not have limits in exploring 
 
10 As in similar works that use I-O tables, we implicitly assume that the latter represent a technology made of input-
output relationships fixed in the medium term. We assume that the bundles of inputs, as well as the order in which 
they come, are fixed in the medium term. Inputs and processes can change with innovation only in a longer term. 
Expenditure shares are more endogenous to changing demand-supply equilibria. Further assumptions include the ab-
sence of economies of scale and the existence of representative firms.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3488349 
19 
 
the supply network, thus 𝜒𝜒 = 1, and that the share of intermediate inputs across industries is con-
stant, thus 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 = 𝛿𝛿 = 0.5. The latter figure finds support on estimates by Acemoglu et al. (2012) 
made for the ensemble of the U.S. economy. A darker cell in Figure 5 implies that that input 
industry is more technologically relevant for that specific output. Interestingly, in the upper part 
of the figure, we find that services industries are much important across many manufacturing and 
services industries. Among manufacturing outputs, a crucial role is played by Primary Metal Man-
ufacturing (code 331), Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing (332), and Mining industries (code 
21).  
In Tables 1 and 2, we report some moments of the Input Rank distributions, first for all the 
top 20 inputs, then for the top 20 manufacturing inputs excluding services. Here, as well, services 
industries are on average ranked higher than manufacturing industries. The first highly ranked 
input is the Management of Companies and Enterprises (code 550000), which includes headquar-
ters services by holding firms11. Some post-production services also rank relatively high, as ex-
pected, e.g. Wholesale Trade (code 420000) and Advertising (code 541800). Further, we spot on 
top of rankings Electric Power Generation (code 221100) and bank credit (Monetary Authorities 
and Depository Credit Intermediation, code 52A000). From Appendix Table C1, R&D input ser-
vices (code 541700) are much relevant for General Federal Defense Government Services (code 
S00500) and life sciences industries (In-vitro Diagnostic Substance Manufacturing, code 325413; 
Biological Product Manufacturing, code 325413; Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing, code 
325412; Medicinal and Botanical Manufacturing, code 325411). The first manufacturing input 
encountered among the Top 20 is the Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy Manufacturing (code 
331110), which comes only after Truck Transportation (code 484000). When we look from the 
perspective of selected root industries (Electronic Computer Manufacturing, code 334111; Auto-
mobile Manufacturing, code 336111), in Appendix Tables C2 and C3, we find that the Input Rank 
is indeed much heterogeneous across production processes, with relatively high standard devia-
tions across end-use industries.  
  
 In an Online Appendix, we also report computations of the Input Rank on world Input-
Output Tables, namely WIOD (World Input-Output Tables, see Timmer et al., 2015) and Eora 
Global MRIO tables. Both databases have been extensively used in settings where the geographical 
dimension of GVCs is important. However, we prefer keeping our baseline analyses using U.S. 
tables for two main reasons. First, U.S. tables have a fine-grained disaggregation of industries that 
 
11 As from the original definition (BLS, 2018): “This sector comprises: i) companies that hold financial activities 
(securities or other equity interests) in other companies for the purpose of a corporate control to influence management 
decisions; ii) companies that professionally administer, oversee, and manage other companies through strategic or 
organizational planning and decision making.” 
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reduces the possibility of mixing intermediate inputs and final goods12. Second, our theoretical 
setup does not provide any foundation for considering the country of origin of an input. In fact, we 
assumed that an industry-level technology is fixed in the medium-long term, but we cannot extend 
this assumption to the origin countries of a sourcing strategy. 
 
 
Table 1: Top 20 inputs (all industries) by Input Rank (damping factor = 0.5),  
as from U.S. BEA 2002 I-O tables 
 
 




12 Both WIOD data and Eora Global MRIO adopt 2-digit industry classifications. Please note how wider industrial 
aggregations may bias the Input Rank, as each aggregation potentially include a bigger set of intermediate inputs. This 
problem had been already acknowledged by Alfaro and Charlton (2009), when they found that 2-digit classifications 
led to an underestimation of vertical FDI and an overestimation of horizontal FDI. 
IO code Input name mean p50 sd min max
550000 Management of companies and enterprises 0.0323 0.0306 0.0143 0.0068 0.0936
420000 Wholesale trade 0.0277 0.0279 0.0124 0.0030 0.0949
531000 Real estate 0.0235 0.0170 0.0174 0.0066 0.1215
541800 Advertising and related services 0.0145 0.0125 0.0078 0.0042 0.0606
221100 Electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution
0.0116 0.0093 0.0079 0.0023 0.0749
52A000 Monetary authorities and depository credit 
intermediation
0.0115 0.0092 0.0072 0.0041 0.0589
517000 Telecommunications 0.0093 0.0073 0.0062 0.0032 0.0666
484000 Truck transportation 0.0090 0.0079 0.0065 0.0011 0.0785
331110 Iron and steel mills and ferroalloy 
manufacturing
0.0088 0.0022 0.0156 0.0003 0.1192
523000 Securities, commodity contracts, 
investments, and related activities
0.0084 0.0064 0.0142 0.0026 0.2471
324110 Petroleum refineries 0.0083 0.0045 0.0141 0.0017 0.1307
561300 Employment services 0.0078 0.0053 0.0062 0.0028 0.0382
211000 Oil and gas extraction 0.0072 0.0040 0.0144 0.0012 0.1975
541100 Legal services 0.0071 0.0064 0.0029 0.0030 0.0246
533000 Lessors of nonfinancial intangible assets 0.0070 0.0059 0.0052 0.0017 0.0770
541610 Management, scientific, and technical 
consulting services
0.0065 0.0049 0.0044 0.0018 0.0451
722000 Food services and drinking places 0.0061 0.0048 0.0040 0.0018 0.0250
230301 Nonresidential maintenance and repair 0.0054 0.0043 0.0056 0.0018 0.0790
522A00 Nondepository credit intermediation and 
related activities
0.0054 0.0041 0.0065 0.0022 0.1042




Table 2: Top 20 inputs (manufacturing only) by Input Rank (damping factor = 0.5),  







5    The role of the Input Rank in choices of vertical integration 
 
The decision to make or buy an input is an example of a situation when a producer needs gathering 
information on the technological relevance of both direct and indirect inputs. In this Section, we 
test whether the Input Rank can play a role as a determinant for the decision to integrate a produc-
tion stage within the firm boundary (i.e., vertical integration) or, alternatively, signing supply con-
tracts with independent firms (i.e., outsourcing). For our purpose, we will make use of a dataset of 
U.S. parent companies that have integrated at least one production stage over time. Our empirical 
strategy explicitly takes on the theoretical framework by Antràs and Chor (2013), while augment-
ing the estimates by Del Prete and Rungi (2017) with the inclusion of the Input Rank.  
IO code Input name mean p50 sd min max
331110 Iron and steel mills and ferroalloy manufacturing 0.0088 0.0022 0.0156 0.0003 0.1192
324110 Petroleum refineries 0.0083 0.0045 0.0141 0.0017 0.1307
336300 Motor vehicle parts manufacturing 0.0052 0.0024 0.0143 0.0010 0.1686
325211 Plastics material and resin manufacturing 0.0052 0.0015 0.0139 0.0002 0.1584
325190 Other basic organic chemical manufacturing 0.0051 0.0019 0.0108 0.0003 0.0934
334413 Semiconductor and related device manufacturing 0.0041 0.0030 0.0061 0.0004 0.0792
322210 Paperboard container manufacturing 0.0039 0.0022 0.0051 0.0003 0.0418
32619A Other plastics product manufacturing 0.0039 0.0020 0.0044 0.0005 0.0299
334418 Printed circuit assembly (electronic assembly) 
manufacturing
0.0035 0.0024 0.0047 0.0003 0.0400
321100 Sawmills and wood preservation 0.0030 0.0006 0.0109 0.0002 0.1318
323110 Printing 0.0030 0.0016 0.0057 0.0007 0.0704
322120 Paper mills 0.0028 0.0010 0.0086 0.0002 0.0863
326110 Plastics packaging materials and unlaminated film and 
sheet manufacturing
0.0027 0.0010 0.0045 0.0001 0.0380
332710 Machine shops 0.0026 0.0019 0.0025 0.0002 0.0143
3259A0 All other chemical product and preparation 
manufacturing
0.0023 0.0015 0.0026 0.0003 0.0207
322130 Paperboard mills 0.0021 0.0012 0.0051 0.0002 0.0627
33131A Alumina refining and primary aluminum production 0.0020 0.0003 0.0084 0.0001 0.1146
332800 Coating, engraving, heat treating and allied activities 0.0019 0.0018 0.0015 0.0001 0.0081
325220 Artificial and synthetic fibers and filaments 
manufacturing
0.0019 0.0001 0.0105 0.0000 0.1271




5.1   A sample of U.S. parent companies 
 
We source firm-level data from the Orbis database, compiled by the Bureau van Dijk. For our 
scope, we collect information on 20,489 U.S. parent companies controlling 154,836 subsidiaries 
around the world at the end of the year 201513. In Table 4, we provide some descriptive statistics 
of the geographic coverage of the subsidiaries. Both subsidiaries and parent companies can be 
active in any industry: manufacturing (28.86%), services (69%), primary (0.29%), and extractive 
(1.85%). About 81% of subsidiaries integrated by U.S. parents are domestic. Not surprisingly, U.S. 
parent companies are involved mainly in global supply networks across other OECD economies, 
where 96% of their subsidiaries are located. The member States of the European Union host the 
largest number of foreign subsidiaries. Among them, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Neth-
erlands attract a significant share of U.S. foreign affiliates active in services industries. Not sur-
prisingly, NAFTA members, i.e. Canada and Mexico, mainly host manufacturing of final and in-
termediate goods. However, a non-negligible share of subsidiaries is present in Asia, Africa, and 
the Middle East. 
      To validate our sample, we compare with official ‘Data on Activities of Multinational Enter-
prises’ (BEA, 2018) and OECD Statistics on Measuring Globalization (OECD, 2018). In 2015, 
BEA (2018) reports 6,880 billion dollars of total sales by foreign affiliates and 12,628 billion dol-
lars of total sales by parent companies. The U.S. multinational enterprises present in our sample 
account for 94% and 92% of the BEA (2018) values, respectively. The number of foreign affiliates 
in our sample corresponds to 88.6% on the total of U.S. foreign subsidiaries reported in OECD 
(2018), although the latter source only reports the values for the year 2014. 
 For the scope of our analysis, we map industry affiliations of both parent companies and 
subsidiaries from the NAICS rev. 2012 classification into the 2002 U.S. BEA I-O Input-Output 
Tables. The match by industry affiliations allows us combining firm-level data with sector-level 
metrics, including the Input Rank we computed in Section 4, the Relative Upstreamness segments 
sourced from Alfaro et al. (2019), and a measure of Network Distance between any industry pair14 
calculated on the same U.S tables. In the absence of actual data on firm-to-firm transactions, such 
a mapping15 allows us proxying buyer-supplier relationships. Finally, we complement our data 
 
13 We follow international standards for the identification of corporate control structures (OECD, 2005; UNCTAD, 
2009; UNCTAD, 2016), according to which the unit of observation is the control link between a parent company and 
each of its subsidiary that is controlled after a concentration of voting rights (> 50%). See also Rungi et al. (2017). 
Similar data structures have been used in Alviarez et al. (2016), Cravino and Levchenko (2017), Del Prete and Rungi 
(2017). 
14 The Network Distance between any input and any output in the U.S. I-O tables is the minimum number of down-
stream linkages that connect them through 
15 For similar mappings of firm-level sourcing based on input-output tables and industry affiliations, see Alfaro and 
Charlton (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2010), Alfaro et al. (2016), Rungi and Del Prete (2018). 
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with industry-level estimates of demand elasticity sourced from Broda and Weinstein (2006), and 
with a measure of input contractibility retrieved from Antràs and Chor (2013). 
       
 
Table 4: Sample geographic coverage by country of subsidiaries 
 
 
Note: intermediate and final manufacturing categories based on industry affiliates and following the  





N. % N. % N. % N. %
United States 20,571 16.3 24,590 19.5 80,729 64.1 125,890 100.0
European Union 1,934 11.5 2,084 12.3 12,872 76.2 16,890 100.0
of which:
   Germany 273 13.2 306 14.8 1,494 72.1 2,073 100.0
   France 171 11.0 213 13.7 1,167 75.2 1,551 100.0
   United Kingdom 563 11.4 624 12.7 3,734 75.9 4,921 100.0
   Italy 136 19.4 139 19.8 427 60.8 702 100.0
   Netherlands 158 6.8 171 7.3 2,005 85.9 2,334 100.0
Canada 980 30.4 923 28.6 1,325 41.1 3,228 100.0
Russia 18 11.7 30 19.5 106 68.8 154 100.0
Asia 251 15.0 312 18.7 1,109 66.3 1,672 100.0
of which:
   Japan 87 11.5 76 10.1 592 78.4 755 100.0
   China 92 12.1 66 8.7 605 79.3 763 100.0
   India 122 15.7 149 19.1 508 65.2 779 100.0
Africa 67 14.2 93 19.7 313 66.2 473 100.0
Middle East 82 18.2 80 17.8 288 64.0 450 100.0
Latin America 221 12.1 395 21.6 1,210 66.3 1,826 100.0
of which:
   Argentina 24 8.1 70 23.6 203 68.4 297 100.0
   Brazil 137 14.6 219 23.3 583 62.1 939 100.0
   Mexico 98 23.3 154 36.6 169 40.1 421 100.0
Australia 123 14.2 157 18.1 586 67.7 866 100.0
Rest of the world 489 16.5 585 19.7 1,892 63.8 2,966 100.0
Total 24,834 16.0 29,403 19.0 100,599 65.0 154,836 100.0
Intermediates Services All industriesCountry of 
subsidiaries
Final goods
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5.2   Baseline results 
 
We test a conditional logit model with parent-level fixed effects, as it is a natural empirical strategy 
for the multinomial case with a set of ex-ante alternatives16. That is, we test the determinants of 
vertical integration choices controlling for the characteristics of both the production stages that are 
vertically integrated and not integrated by the parent company. 
      Let ℎ = 1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁  denote the set of inputs, as from the input-output tables, and let 𝑟𝑟 =
1,2, … ,𝑅𝑅 denote the set of parent companies, each active in an output industry, 𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, … ,𝐾𝐾. The 
dependent variable, 𝑦𝑦ℎ𝑟𝑟(𝑘𝑘), takes on a value 1 when at least one subsidiary in the h-th input market 
has been integrated by a parent r in industry k, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, for each parent com-
pany, we have a vector 𝐲𝐲ℎ𝑟𝑟(𝑘𝑘) = �𝑦𝑦1𝑟𝑟(𝑘𝑘), … ,𝑦𝑦𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟(𝑘𝑘)� made of 0s and 1s when a h-th input has been 
integrated or not, respectively. At this point, we can consider the probability that a generic parent 
chooses among a set of alternatives such that:  
 
 
Pr�𝐲𝐲𝑟𝑟(𝑘𝑘)� ∑ 𝑦𝑦ℎ𝑟𝑟(𝑘𝑘)𝑁𝑁ℎ=1 � =




where  𝐒𝐒ℎ is a set of ex ante alternative binary choices and each of its elements, 𝑠𝑠ℎ 𝜖𝜖 𝐒𝐒ℎ, is equal 
to 1 when the h-th input is integrated, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, we identify a vector of covariates 
for each input-parent pair, 𝐱𝐱ℎ𝑟𝑟,which includes: the Input Rank of the h-th input with respect to the 
k-th industry estimated with a damping factor equal to 0.5; the minimum distance in a supply 
network of any h-th input from a k-th output; a binary variable Complements relative to the h-th 
input market; the input-output upstreamness sourced from Alfaro et al. (2019); the input-specific 
Contractibility derived from Rauch (1999); the bilateral normalized Direct requirement coefficient 
from I-O tables. As in Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019), the variable Complements 
is equal to 1 when the elasticity of substitution of the output market is below the median 
(𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘 > 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑), and 0 otherwise  (𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘 < 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑). Errors are clustered by the parent company. Fixed 
effects are at the parent level. Results from nested specifications are reported in Tables 5. 
 
The coefficient of immediate interest to us is the one on the Input Rank, which indicates 
whether the odds of vertical integration are higher for a more relevant input in the supply network. 
We do find that the coefficient of the Input Rank is positive and significant throughout all our 
estimates. Exponentiating the coefficients, we obtain a range of higher odds for vertical integration 
 
16 See McFadden (1974) and Chamberlain (1980) for more details. Present notation is in line with Hamerle and Ron-
ning (1995) and Hosmer et al. (2013). See also Head et al. (1995) and Del Prete and Rungi (2017) for previous appli-
cations in international economics. 
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in a range between 1.21 and 1.56. In the first columns, we consider all parent companies, whether 
they are active in a manufacturing or a service industry. Please note that in further columns, when 
we introduce industry controls, the sample reduces to manufacturing parents only. This is mainly 
due to the inclusion of the elasticity of substitution by Broda and Weinstein (2006), as it is origi-
nally estimated only on manufacturing imports.  
 
 
Table 5: Baseline regressions I: parent-level fixed effects conditional logit 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Input is integrated ==1         
          
Input Rank 0.445*** 0.259*** 0.185*** 0.285*** 
  (0.011) (0.024) (0.016) (0.006) 
Input Rank * Complements   0.100*** 0.098*** 0.209*** 
    (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) 
Input upstreamness   -0.812* -0.843*** -0.566 
    (0.415) (0.335) (0.618) 
Input upstreamness * Complements   0.033 -0.177*** 0.015 
    (0.039) (0.018) (0.078) 
Contractibility   -0.390*** -0.645*** -0.249*** 
    (0.017) (0.032) (0.025) 
Input Network Distance -0.115*** -0.134* -0.256 -0.105** 
  (0.028) (0.069) (0.309) (0.055) 
Direct requirement 0.093*** 0.015* 0.010* 0.026 
  (0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.034) 
Observations 8,564,068 1,151,908 595,218 542,872 
N. parent companies 20,294 4,084 2,110 1,925 
Pseudo R-squared 0.515 0.752 0.698 0.842 
Clustered errors by parent Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Note: Input Rank estimated with a damping factor = 0.5. Errors clustered by parent in parentheses. Variables are standardizes. 
***, **, * stand for p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05 and p-value < 0.10, respectively.   
 
 
Our findings are robust after the inclusion of the Input Upstreamness, which proxies the 
relative technological distance between an input and a target output. In this case, more distant 
inputs are less likely integrated by the parent company. The central tenet of the theoretical frame-
work by Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019) is tested by the sign of the interaction 
term between the Input Upstreamness and Complements. According to these authors, when final 
demand is sufficiently elastic (inelastic), parents integrate production stages that are more proxi-
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mate to (far from) final demand. This seems to be the case for producers of final goods (penulti-
mate column in Table 5), although results are not significant anymore in the case of midstream 
parents (last column), i.e., the prediction by Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019) is not 
verified in the case of integration choices started by producers of intermediate inputs. To extend 
the role of the elasticity of substitution to the case of supply networks, we include a similar inter-
action term between the variable Complements and the Input Rank. In this case, when final demand 
is sufficiently elastic, we find that the odds are proportionally higher that a central input is inte-
grated within the boundary of the firm. More in general, the latter result is in line with our basic 
framework (see Section 3.5 and Proposition 2 in Appendix A), according to which a more elastic 
final demand makes downstream buyers more vulnerable to upstream frictions. In this case, we 
can argue, vertical integration could be a way to reduce the impact of upstream frictions. 
Please note how, as expected, the Direct Requirement and the input-specific Contractibility 
have a positive and negative coefficient, respectively. In the first case, a higher value of the trans-
action (if any) is trivially correlated with higher odds of vertical integration. In the second case, a 
more contractible input is less likely integrated because the agreement between a producer and an 
independent supplier can be more easily enforced. 
 
 
5.3   Robustness checks 
 
Our baseline findings are robust to several checks of robustness. In Table 6, we check whether 
sample compositions and changes in parameters can have an impact on the sign and significance 
of our coefficients of interest while keeping the Input Rank with a damping factor equal to 0.5. In 
the first column, we exclude inputs coming from the same 2-digit industry of the parent companies. 
In the second column, we exclude services inputs to check whether these are exclusively driving 
the correlation with the Input Rank, as we expect them to be more relevant on average, as from 
descriptive statistics. In the third column, we modify our indicator of Complements, explicitly 
considering the difference between the elasticities of the output and the one of each input, 
(𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘 − 𝜌𝜌ℎ), i.e. introducing a reference point internal to the supply network. In the fourth column, 
we reduce our sample to the Top 100 (direct or indirect) inputs with the highest Input Rank. In all 
these cases, when an input is more technologically relevant in the supply network, the odds are 
higher that the parent companies will make rather than buy the input from an independent supplier.  
 In Appendix Tables C4 and C5, we further control for: i) sample compositions when we 
consider only midstream manufacturing parents, i.e. parent that produce intermediate inputs; ii) 
empirical specifications different from the fixed-effects conditional logit. All main findings are 
similar in sign and significance with baseline estimates. 
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 Finally, in Appendix Table C6, we modify the Input Rank by plugging in the contractibility 
index retrieved by Rauch (1999), in order to proxy a second component of the damping factor, 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘, 
which allows us catching the knowledge of a supply network. All our main tenets are stable, although 
magnitudes of coefficients on the Input Rank generally increase. 
 
 












puts Input is integrated ==1 
          
Input Rank 0.679*** 0.251*** 0.255*** 0.334*** 
  (0.152) (0.044) (0.044) (0.065) 
Input Rank * Complements 0.106*** 0.095*** 0.078*** 0.128*** 
  (0.026) (0.023) (0.015) (0.026) 
Input upstreamness -0.892** -0.768 -0.649* -0.611** 
  (0.468) (0.630) (0.334) (0.309) 
Input upstreamness * Complements 0.254 0.313 0.347 0.248* 
  (0.156) (0.240) (0.651) (0.132) 
Contractibility -0.511*** -0.289*** -0.413*** -0.456*** 
  (0.027) (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) 
Input Network Distance -0.052 -0.095* -0.105 0.089 
  (0.079) (0.049) (0.085) (0.126) 
Direct requirement 0.028 -0.008 0.028* 0.040 
  (0.035) (0.005) (0.017) (0.055) 
Observations 741,066 905,640 1,151,908 156,705 
N. parent companies 2,637 3,903 4,084 2,847 
Pseudo R-squared 0.118 0.285 0.290 0.309 
Clustered errors by parent Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Note: Input Rank estimated with a damping factor = 0.5. Errors clustered by parent in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for p-value < 
0.01, p-value < 0.05 and p-value < 0.10, respectively. 
 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
In this contribution, we introduced the Input Rank as a measure to catch the technological rele-
vance of direct and indirect inputs in the supply network. We frame the input ranking problem as 
the solution of a representative producer that needs minimizing the impact of frictions coming 
from upstream markets when they can hit her marginal costs in a network-like production function. 
The main intuition is that we must consider the peculiar topology of any supply network to derive 
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the impact of any input on downstream marginal costs. Eventually, a (direct or indirect) input will 
rank relatively higher when considering the entire supply network: i) its direct requirements are 
higher; ii) it has a central position, i.e. it delivers to many other inputs; iii) it delivers to other inputs 
that have a central position; iv) the usage of intermediate inputs is higher than the usage of labor. 
For sake of comparison with previous GVC positioning metrics (e.g., downstreamness and 
upstreamness segments), we compute it on U.S. 2002 BEA Input-Output tables, and then we test 
how it correlates with firm-level choices of vertical integration made by U.S. parent companies 
worldwide. We do find that an input with a higher ranking more likely will be integrated within 
the boundary of the firm, even more so when the demand of the final product is more elastic. We 
argue that vertical integration allows downstream buyers reducing the possibility that frictions on 
upstream markets could hit their production processes, even more so when the margins from final 
sales are smaller. Our findings are robust to several checks on sample compositions, parameter 
choices, and empirical specifications. More in general, we argue that the Input Rank catches the 
recursive and complex nature of real-world supply networks, which have been too often repre-
sented as supposedly linear chains in studies on the international organization of production. Cer-
tainly, both empirics and theory need better considering the technological loops, kinks, and corners 
that can magnify or dampen a shock in a supply network, finally shaping the organizational re-
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A – Proof Appendix 
 
 
Lemma 1. Let 𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘+denote the set of inputs of firms in sector k. The cost function of firm i is given 
by  
 
 𝑐𝑐[𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖);  𝑤𝑤,𝒑𝒑] = 𝜆𝜆(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖)𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) (A1) 
 






Proof of Lemma 1. The Lagrangian of the cost minimization problem of firm i from sector k is: 
 
 
ℒ = 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) + �𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑥𝑥(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖,ℎ) −
𝑀𝑀
ℎ=1











From the first-order necessary conditions (also sufficient, given convexity), we deliver the follow-
ing conditional demand functions: 
 
 











Plugging (A3) and (A4) into the cost of firm i, it directly follows that 𝑐𝑐[𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖);  𝑤𝑤,𝒑𝒑] =
𝜆𝜆(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖)𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖). Hence, 𝜆𝜆(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) is the marginal cost of production of firm i. Substituting (A3) and 
(A4) into the production function, we obtain: 
 







































 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3488349 
33 
 
where for the last equality we used that 𝜁𝜁𝑘𝑘 = 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘
−𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 ∏ (𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑘𝑘)−𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑘𝑘ℎ∈𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘+ . Solving for 𝜆𝜆(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖), we 
get: 
 





Q. E. D.                                                                                                             □  
 
 
Lemma 2. The following relations are valid between firm-level marginal cost 𝜆𝜆(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) and sector-





1−𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘𝜆𝜆(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) (A7) 
  
 






Proof of Lemma 2. Using results from the theory of monopolistic competition, the sector-level 
price of good k, 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘, and the sector-level output, 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘, are given with: 
 
 

































𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘−1𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) (A12) 
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Thanks to the assumption of constant returns to scale and using the expression for 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘, we can write 
the sector level marginal cost of production as: 
  
 
















Finally, from the firm’s pricing rule we have 𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) = 𝜇𝜇(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖)𝜆𝜆(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖). Plugging the pricing rule in 
the expression for price from A (11) and A (12), we get: 
 













1−𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘  𝜇𝜇(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖)𝜆𝜆(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) = 𝜇𝜇(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖)𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 
 
(A14) 
Q. E. D.     □  
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. Taking logarithms17 of (A6), using the pricing rule (𝑝𝑝ℎ = 𝜇𝜇ℎ𝜆𝜆ℎ), and 
normalizing 𝑤𝑤 = 1, we get: 
 


























�. Writing the above equation for all k’s in vector notation, we get: 
 
𝛌𝛌� =  𝐄𝐄 + 𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆′𝝁𝝁� − 𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆′𝝉𝝉�  +  𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆′𝛌𝛌� = 
 
17 To ease notation, we indicate logarithms with an accent on variables. 
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 = (𝐈𝐈 − 𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆′)−1[𝐄𝐄+ 𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆′(𝝁𝝁� − 𝝉𝝉�)] (A17) 
  







= −𝐞𝐞𝑘𝑘′ (𝐈𝐈 − 𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆′)−1𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆′𝐞𝐞ℎ = −𝐞𝐞𝑘𝑘′ [(𝐈𝐈 − 𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆′)−1 − 𝐈𝐈]𝐞𝐞ℎ = 
 = −𝐞𝐞ℎ′ [(𝐈𝐈 − 𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆)−1 − 𝐈𝐈]𝐞𝐞𝑘𝑘 (A18) 
 





= −𝐞𝐞ℎ′ [𝐈𝐈 − 𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆]−1𝐞𝐞𝑘𝑘 (A19) 
 
Q. E. D.   □  
 
 
Lemma 3. Given the demand for good k, then partial derivative 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦�
(𝑘𝑘,   𝑖𝑖)
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏�ℎ
 is positive and increasing 
in 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3. Let 𝑥𝑥(ℎ, 𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) denote the aggregate demand for variety 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑘𝑘 by firms in a 
sector h. From the market clearing condition for variety i, we have 
 
 



























𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘−1𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑦ℎ  (A20) 
  
Taking logs and simplifying, we get: 
 
 𝑦𝑦�(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) = −𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝�(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) + (𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘 − 1)𝑝𝑝�𝑘𝑘 + log(𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘) 
 
(A21) 
As demand for good k is fixed, (𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘) remains constant, and we note that: 






































 , (A22) 
  
where we used the symmetry property of the equilibrium 𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) = 𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘, 𝑗𝑗)  ∀𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑘𝑘, and the fact 
that 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑘𝑘,𝑗𝑗)
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏�ℎ





























.  From Proposition 1, we know that 𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
�(𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖)
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏�ℎ
< 0 and that 
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆�(𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖)
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏�ℎ
 is independent of 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘. From this and the fact that 𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘 ≥ 1 and 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘 > 1, the claim follows di-
rectly. 
 
Q. E. D.   □  
 
Proposition 2. Given the demand for good k, then 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋�(𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖)
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏�ℎ𝜕𝜕𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘
> 0 whenever 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘 > 1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. We can write the profit of firm i as: 
 
𝜋𝜋(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) = 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝜆𝜆(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖)𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) − 𝜆𝜆(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖)𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) = 
 
 = (𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 − 1)𝜆𝜆(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖)𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) =
1
𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘 − 1
𝜆𝜆(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖)𝑦𝑦(𝑘𝑘, 𝑖𝑖) (A24) 
  
Then, taking logs and differentiating: 
  













From Proposition 1, we know that 𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
�(𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖)
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏�ℎ
 is proportional to the Input Rank and independent of 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘. 
From Lemma 3, we have that 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦�
(𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖)
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏�ℎ
 increases with 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘. This means that 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋�(𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖)
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏�ℎ
 is also increasing 
in 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘 . 
 





B – Appendix: from the Page Rank to the Input Rank 
 
The empirical intuition of the Input Rank comes from the ‘personalized’ version of the PageRank 
centrality, first used in social networks and search engines (Brin and Page, 1998) to present to 
users the most pertinent content. Some variants of the PageRank have been used in many domains 
(bibliometrics, biology, physics, engineering of infrastructures, financial exposure, etc.) as an al-
ternative to the Katz (1953) centrality (Gleich, 2015). The underlying assumption is that more 
important nodes (in our case, inputs) are likely to receive more links from other nodes (in our case, 
inputs of inputs), and that proximity to central nodes implies, in turn, a relatively higher centrality. 
 
 For our scope, we are interested in the ‘local’ outreach of a specific root buyer in her ori-
ented supply network. Therefore, we need a ‘personalization’ of the ranking problem in the spirit 
of Haveliwala (2003) and White and Smyth (2003), because different rankings are possible for 
different root nodes. Starting from the original formulation of the PageRank, adopting the notation 
proposed by Gleich (2015), the eigenvalue/eigenvector problem can be represented by the follow-
ing identity:  
 
 [(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐏𝐏 + 𝛼𝛼𝐯𝐯𝐞𝐞′]𝐱𝐱 = 𝐱𝐱 
 
(B1) 
 For our scope, we discuss the correspondence between elements in (B1) and their counter-
parts in the Input Rank (see Equation 11), in light of the peculiar economic process at stake: 
 
• In the PageRank, a transition matrix 𝐏𝐏 contains the probabilities that an internet user clicks 
on one page following a web link present on the one she is visiting, column-normalized by 
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the total number of received links, i.e. its in-degree. In the Input Rank, we use the matrix 
of an Input-Output table, 𝐆𝐆, whose single elements are column-normalized buyer-supplier 
transactions, 𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑘𝑘 ∈ [0, 1].  
 
• A vector 𝐯𝐯 is a critical tool that allows for the ‘personalization’ of the PageRank. In the 
absence of ‘personalization’, this vector contains just a uniform distribution of probability 
across all web pages, which is valid for all users. A ‘personalization’ entails a non-uniform 
distribution of probabilities, such that a region of the web will be more likely visited. At 
the same time, the vector 𝐞𝐞 is a unitary vector that algebraically extends the same (uniform 
or non-uniform) distribution in 𝐯𝐯 across web users. In our Input Rank, we can think of the 
combination of 𝐯𝐯 and 𝐞𝐞 as a specific portion of the production network, where the supply 
network of a root producer can be found. In a nutshell, in the case of the Input Rank, the 
representative producer in an output market will be able to explore only the technology of 
its supply network.  
 
• The term 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0, 1)  is a teleportation parameter in the PageRank, otherwise called a 
damping factor. It indicates the probability that a ‘web surfer’ interrupts random navigation 
following page-to-page links and falls elsewhere, on any other web page not directly linked 
to the one she is visiting. By converse, (1 − 𝛼𝛼) is the probability that the user goes on 
randomly following her web path made of cross-link citations. In our Input Rank, we sub-
stitute 𝛼𝛼 with the product of two parameters, 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 and 𝜒𝜒𝑘𝑘. The first indicates the relative us-
age of intermediate inputs, as from the Cobb-Douglas production function of Equation (5). 
The second indicates the ability of the producer to navigate her supply network, as from 
Definition 2.   
 
• Finally, 𝐱𝐱 is the solution to the eigenvalue problem in (B1). In the case of the PageRank, it 
indicates the relevance of the web content for each user, as for example after a query from 
a search engine. In the Input Rank, a vector 𝝊𝝊𝒌𝒌 represents an ordering of all direct and 
indirect inputs based on the impact that any upstream friction may have on the marginal 
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C – Appendix Tables and Graphs 
 
 




Note: Number of input industries by output ordered on the x-axis. Average: 122. Minimum at the Logging industry 








Note: Number of buying industries by output ordered on the x-axis. Average: 122. Minimum at the Museums, Histor-
ical Sites, Zoos, and Parks (code 712000) is 0. Maximum at the Wholesale Trade (code 420000) is 425.  
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Table C2: Top 10 direct or indirect inputs by Input Rank for the Automotive Manufactur-







IO code Output name
R&D Input rank  
(alpha =0.5)
S00500 General Federal defense government services 0.0384
325413 In-vitro diagnostic substance manufacturing 0.0317
325414 Biological product (except diagnostic) 
manufacturing
0.0293
325412 Pharmaceutical preparation manufacturing 0.0247
325411 Medicinal and botanical manufacturing 0.0226
325320 Pesticide and other agricultural chemical 
manufacturing
0.0211
3259A0 All other chemical product and preparation 
manufacturing
0.0211
325620 Toilet preparation manufacturing 0.0193
325910 Printing ink manufacturing 0.0192
325610 Soap and cleaning compound manufacturing 0.0190
IO code Input name
Input rank  
(alpha = 0.5)
336300 Motor vehicle parts manufacturing 0.1686
420000 Wholesale trade 0.0353
550000 Management of companies and enterprises 0.0302
331110 Iron and steel mills and ferroalloy manufacturing 0.0101
531000 Real estate 0.0087
541800 Advertising and related services 0.0078
334413 Semiconductor and related device manufacturing 0.0072
484000 Truck transportation 0.0071
32619A Other plastics product manufacturing 0.0057
221100 Electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution
0.0054
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3488349 
41 
 
Table C3: Top 10 direct or indirect inputs by Input Rank for the Electronic Computer 


























IO code Industry name
Input rank  
(alpha = 0.5)
334112 Computer storage device manufacturing 0.0568
420000 Wholesale trade 0.0553
550000 Management of companies and enterprises 0.0467
334418 Printed circuit assembly (electronic assembly) 
manufacturing
0.0400
334413 Semiconductor and related device manufacturing 0.0374
511200 Software publishers 0.0305
33411A Computer terminals and other computer peripheral 
equipment manufacturing
0.0190
541800 Advertising and related services 0.0132
531000 Real estate 0.0121
541700 Scientific research and development services 0.0112




Table C4: Robustness to sample composition considering midstream parents only, parent-









puts Input is integrated ==1 
          
Input Rank 0.092*** 0.180*** 0.173*** 0.149*** 
  (0.033) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) 
Input Rank * Complements 0.131*** 0.092*** 0.190*** 0.234*** 
  (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Input upstreamness -1.015** -1.197 -0.794 -1.618*** 
  (0.515) (0.765) (0.547) (0.116) 
Input upstreamness * Complements 0.792 1.112 0.385*** 1.904*** 
  (0.582) (0.977) (0.062) (0.132) 
Contractibility -0.191*** -0.163*** -0.271*** -0.276*** 
  (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) 
Input Network distance 0.116 0.114 0.115 0.125 
 (0.128) (0.124) (0.124) (0.222) 
Direct requirement -0.016 0.012*** 0.033*** 0.011** 
  (0.017) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
Observations 316,429 437,805 542,872 87,847 
N. parent companies 1,126 1,887 1,925 1,591 
Pseudo R-squared 0.201 0.289 0.314 0.356 
Clustered errors by parent Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Note: The Input Rank is estimated with a damping factor equal to 0.5. Errors clustered by parent in parentheses. ***, **, * stand 























Table C5: Robustness to changing empirical strategy 
Dependent variable: Linear probability 
model Logit Probit Input is integrated ==1 
        
Input Rank 0.012*** 0.151*** 0.074*** 
  (0.001)    (0.005)    (0.002)    
Input Rank * Complements 0.084*** 0.222*** 0.119*** 
  (0.011)    (0.014)    (0.012)    
Input upstreamness -0.003** -0.766*** -0.243*** 
  (0.002)    (0.354)    (0.029)    
Input upstreamness * Complements -0.001 -0.215 -0.210** 
  (0.001)    (0.119)    (0.099)    
Contractibility -0.001*** -0.354*** -0.141*** 
  (0.001)    (0.017)    (0.007)    
Input Network distance 0.051 -0.098* -0.145 
 (0.145) (0.051) (0.178) 
Direct requirement 0.015 0.018*** 0.011*** 
  (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.001)    
Constant 0.005*** -4.824*** -.789*** 
  (0.001)    (0.035)    (0.012)    
Observations 1,257,668 1,257,668 1,257,668 
N. parent companies 4,717 4,717 4,717 
R squared / Pseudo 0.124    0.209    0.215    
Clustered errors by parent Yes Yes Yes 
Activity of parent companies Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing 
Note: The Input Rank is estimated with a damping factor equal to 0.5. Errors clustered by parent in parentheses. ***, **, * stand 
























Table C6: Input Rank with sector-specific damping factors 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Input is integrated ==1         
          
Input Rank 0.506*** 0.274*** 0.199*** 0.091*** 
  (0.013) (0.025) (0.015) (0.008) 
Input Rank * Complements   0.101*** 0.106*** 0.158*** 
    (0.036) (0.028) (0.058) 
Input upstreamness   -0.309 -0.303*** -0.044 
    (0.215) (0.040) (0.418) 
Input upstreamness * Comple-
ments   0.036 -0.155 0.255*** 
    (0.030) (0.130) (0.068) 
Input Network Distance -0.088*** -0.132 -0.121 -0.105 
  (0.030) (0.068) (0.309) (0.095) 
Direct requirement 0.094*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.026 
  (0.013) (0.003) (0.002) (0.034) 
Observations 8,564,068 1,151,908 595,218 542,872 
N. parent companies 20,294 4,084 2,110 1,925 
Pseudo R-squared 0.548 0.759 0.701 0.815 
Clustered errors by parent Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Note: The Input Rank is estimated with a damping factor equal to input contractibility à la Rauch (1999), specific for each input 
industry. Errors clustered by parent in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05 and p-value < 0.10, respec-
tively. 
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